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NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Many people tend to think that the out-come of any nuclear weapons use today will result in an es-
calatory situation with apocalyptic out-
comes for the countries involved.1 Yet 
many factors are increasing the proba-
bility of the limited use of nuclear weap-
ons (e.g., 1 to 20 warheads) in a range 
of conflict scenarios. Previous atmo-
spheric model simulations of regional 
nuclear conflicts employing many rela-
tively small bombs have been estimated 
to cause a global “nuclear autumn,” with 
great reductions in agricultural pro-
ductivity, stratospheric ozone loss, and 
spread of hazardous radioactive fall-
out.2 The totality of these effects would 
result in widespread damage to human 
well-being and to terrestrial and aquatic 
ecosystems. In this article, we estimate 
minimum thresholds for the prevalent 
types of currently deployed nuclear 
weapons that would cause equivalent 
climate impacts, and provide a discus-
sion of the factors that may influence 
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of Defense William Perry also recently 
warned, “Today, the danger of some sort 
of nuclear catastrophe is greater than 
it was during the Cold War.”4 Secretary 
Perry, speaking about the implications 
of even a limited nuclear exchange, said, 
“The political, economic and social con-
sequences are beyond what people un-
derstand.” Two other former U.S. Sec-
the probability of nuclear weapons use, 
current risk perception, and possible 
mitigation actions.
Due to probabilistic realities, Cam-
bridge physicist Stephen Hawking re-
cently concluded that future use of 
nuclear weapons is highly probable, per-
haps even inevitable, given the passage 
of enough time.3 Former U.S. Secretary 
retaries of Defense, Robert McNamara 
and Graham Allison, and numerous 
nuclear weapons specialists have also 
suggested that future use is probable.5
In previous regional nuclear war 
simulations, roughly 100 nuclear explo-
sions with 15-KT (kilotons) TNT yields 
were estimated to ignite 1,300 square 
kilometers of urban and other devel-
A nuclear-capable Trident D5 SLBM test over 
San Francisco on November 7, 2015.
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oped land area.6 The resulting oxidation 
of carbonaceous materials (e.g., soils, 
biomass, fossil fuels, asphalt, plastics) 
was estimated to disperse >5 million 
metric tons (5 Tg C) of black carbon 
smoke particles into the stratosphere.7 
Most previous nuclear explosions have 
not produced significant black carbon 
emissions because they occurred in the 
U.S. Southwest desert, on small tropi-
cal islands, at high altitudes, or under-
ground.8
As a consequence of 5 Tg of black car-
bon being lofted into the stratosphere, 
solar radiation on land, atmospheric 
surface temperature, and rainfall would 
decrease globally and would likely result 
in a dramatic decrease in global agricul-
tural production. Agricultural growing 
seasons could be reduced by 10 to 40 
days per year for at least 5 years; global 
temperatures could be below normal 
for as long as 25 years; and immediate 
short-term temperatures could be colder 
than have occurred in the last 1,000 
years.9 Precipitation could decrease by 
as much as 20% to 80% in the Asian 
monsoon region.10 Large reductions in 
rainfall would occur in South America 
and southern Africa, and the American 
Southwest and Western Australia could 
be 20% to 60% drier. Climatic changes 
due to nuclear explosions on developed 
land could essentially produce a global 
“nuclear drought,” and the resulting 
famines could kill up to a billion people 
from starvation, which would probably 
most affect those communities that are 
already in food-insecure environments 
in the developing world, particularly 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and 
the Middle East.11 Significant changes 
in precipitation would probably also 
increase conflict in developing regions, 
although global temperature reduc-
tions may reduce social violence in 
the United States and other developed 
countries.12
Natural systems are also at grave risk, 
not just local to where the conflagra-
tion takes place, but also remotely, and 
potentially worldwide. Of particular 
importance are potential consequences 
for ecosystems and affected biodiver-
sity. Widespread (though low-level) 
radiation has been reported through-
out much of the Pacific basin several 
years after the Fukushima disaster in 
March 2011, which implies that radia-
tion and other pollutants due to even 
a limited nuclear strike could be simi-
larly dispersed.13 The spread of toxic 
radionuclides and their long-term ef-
fects would also be greatly magnified if 
a nuclear reactor, a nuclear power plant, 
or a nuclear weapons stockpile were to 
be targeted in any potential nuclear con-
flict, with the latter being the most likely 
set of targets out of the three.14 In 2016, 
former Japanese Prime Minister Naoto 
Kan said that had the Fukushima nu-
clear power plant melted down further, 
the spread of radiation could have been 
worse than the Chernobyl disaster, and 
he stated, “The future existence of Japan 
as a whole was at stake.”15
Due to irreversible physical pro-
cesses described by the second law of 
Anti-nuclear occupy tent protest against the Japanese government in Tokyo, Japan, on May 8, 2015.
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thermodynamics, complex patterns in 
physical systems are less probable than 
disordered systems consisting of smaller 
molecules and random atomic motion, 
which is why complex dynamic struc-
tures have limited lifetimes and disinte-
grate and diffuse when energy becomes 
limited, and why continual energy use 
is needed to reproduce or recreate them 
and work against the tendency toward 
disorder and increasing entropy.16 Be-
cause of these physical principles, “it’s 
always a lot easier to and quicker to de-
stroy something than it is to build it,” 
which is why risk analysts are always 
preparing for the next catastrophe, with 
potential nuclear events being perhaps 
the most cataclysmic.17
Potential for Future Limited 
Use of Nuclear Weapons
Jeffrey Larson, Director of Research 
at the NATO Defense College, recently 
defined “limited nuclear war” as “a con-
flict in which nuclear weapons are used 
in small numbers and in a constrained 
manner in pursuit of limited objectives 
(or are introduced by a country or non-
state actor in the face of conventional 
defeat).”18 Limited use of nuclear weap-
ons by either the United States or other 
nuclear actors is seen by U.S. military 
strategists as possible to occur, either 
as demonstrations to signal willingness 
to escalate conflicts; to achieve conflict 
termination if the United States or an 
ally is in serious military jeopardy; as 
retaliation for a chemical or biological 
weapons attack (or substantial cyberat-
tack or nuclear terrorist attack); or to 
secure a nuclear state that has lost con-
trol of its weapons, among other pos-
sible scenarios; many of these situations 
could lead to use of nuclear weapons on 
noncivilian targets.19 There are also con-
cerns that greater accuracy in warhead 
delivery coupled with lower yield weap-
ons produced in nuclear modernization 
programs may lower the threshold for 
future nuclear weapons use.20 In evalu-
ating the emerging nuclear landscape 
in 2014, James J. Wirtz, the Dean of the 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, stated, 
“Emerging nuclear powers exhibit clear 
indications that they do in fact see great 
utility in nuclear deterrence to include 
interest in the strategic and tactical use 
of their nuclear arsenals to achieve their 
security objectives.”21 Former U.S. Secre-
tary of Defense Robert McNamara, who 
participated in the Cuban Missile Crisis 
of 1962, had repeatedly emphasized that 
humans and politicians are not always 
rational, and our indefinite capacity for 
fallibility increases the probability of 
nuclear weapons use, given their wide-
spread deployment.22 Many observers 
today are concerned that nuclear ac-
tors may fumble into circumstances, 
or make “miscalculations,” where these 
weapons are used.23
Nuclear policy analysts have found 
recent troubling developments in the 
policies of Russia, Pakistan, and In-
dia concerning the first use of nuclear 
weapons. Many analysts agree that the 
shifting nuclear force postures and doc-
trines of these states makes a limited 
nuclear exchange much more prob-
able to occur. Pakistan and India have 
come close to a regional nuclear ex-
change three times in recent decades.24 
Paul Bernstein at the National Defense 
University in Washington, D.C., stated, 
“Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, while of-
ficially still described as ‘credible mini-
mum deterrence,’ in fact has evolved 
toward one reliant on the early first use 
of nuclear weapons.”25 Russian President 
Vladimir Putin recently announced his 
country’s intentions to “strengthen the 
military potential of strategic nuclear 
forces,” specifically the ability of Russian 
missiles to penetrate any defense sys-
tem.26 Bernstein also stated, “It is clear 
that Russian nuclear strategy today en-
compasses a concept for deterring and 
terminating conventional war based 
on the threat of limited nuclear strikes 
for the purposes of ‘demonstration’ and 
‘de-escalation.’”27 Despite great reduc-
tions in nuclear weapon stockpiles by 
the United States and Russia since the 
1980s, now nine countries have nuclear 
weapons programs, most with bombs 
significantly larger than those used at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, in 1945 
(Table 1).
Table 1. Nuclear Weapons Stockpiles and Types by Country in 2016: Test Dates,28 and 
Number Deployed, Reserve, and Total,29 as Strategic and Tactical30
Country First Nuclear Test Deployed Reserve Strategic Tactical Total Stockpile
United States 1945 1,590 2,260 2,600 860–1,040 6,800
Russia 1949 1,790 2,700 2,152 825 7,000
United Kingdom 1952 120 95 215 0 215
France 1960 280 10 200 80 300
China 1964 0 260 260 0 260
India 1974 0 110–120 110–120 0 110–120
Pakistan 1998 0 120–130 120–130 Upgrading 120–130
Israel — 0 80 Unknown Unknown 80
North Korea 2006 0 4–20 4–20 0 4–20
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Nuclear Drought: 
Minimum Thresholds for 
Nuclear Weapons Use and 
Carbon Sources
Many currently deployed nuclear 
weapons, such as air-launched cruise 
missiles (ALCM), submarine-launched 
ballistic missiles (SLBM), interconti-
nental ballistic missiles (ICBM), air-
dropped bombs, and land-based mis-
siles, have explosive yields of 90 KT to 
5 megatons (MT), which are 6 to 330 
times more powerful than those em-
ployed in previous atmospheric model 
simulations that primarily assumed 
multiple 15-KT explosions (Table  2). 
The use of only one 5-MT land-based 
missile deployed by China could burn 
an area similar in size to that of one 
hundred 15-KT explosions. Alterna-
tively, if the United States dropped only 
three 1.2-MT bombs, or used two Tri-
dent D5 SLBM (each with four 475-KT 
warheads), the size of the explosions 
would exceed the land area required to 
produce similar climate impacts. Use 
of only four 800-KT Russian ICBMs 
or ten 300-KT French gravity bombs 
would also have similar climate impacts. 
Thus, use of as few as 1 to 10 deployed 
nuclear weapons, and fewer than 25 of 
these prevalent types, from the five of-
ficial nuclear weapons countries could 
produce a nuclear drought; many of the 
most prevalent types of strategic nuclear 
weapons deployed by these countries 
are shown (Table 2). For these five coun-
Table 2. Major Types of Deployed Nuclear Weapons in 2014 by Delivery System, With 
Explosive Yields and the Equivalent Number of Bombs Needed To Ignite 1,300 Square 
Kilometers (~5 Tg C Emission)35
Bomb Type
(Deployed Warheads, Number) Country
Yield, 
KT
Burn 
Radius, km
Burned 
Area, km2
Equivalent 
Number
Total 
Yield, KT
Air-dropped 
Hiroshima United States 15 2.0 13 100 1,500
B61-12 (in production) United States 50 3.2 32 40.3 2,016
DH-10 ALCM (150) China 90 4.1 52 25.2 2,267
ALCM (78) United States 150 5.0 78 16.7 2,511
B61-3/-4 (184) United States 170 5.2 86 15.1 2,575
AS-15A/B ALCM (72) Russia 200 5.6 98 13.3 2,660
Rafale C/M F3 (50) France 300 6.6 135 9.6 2,884
B61-7/11, B83-1 (11) United States 1,200 11.4 410 3.2 3,806
SLBM
Mk-4/4A, 4x (660) United States 100 4.2 56 23.2 2,315
Trident II D5, 3x (48) United Kingdom 100 4.2 56 23.2 2,315
M45/M51, 4x (48) France 100 4.2 56 23.2 2,315
RSM-54/56, 4x (144) Russia 100 4.2 56 23.2 2,315
JL-1/2 (48) China 300 6.6 135 9.6 2,884
Mk-5, 4x (300) United States 475 7.9 195 6.7 3,162
ICBM
Mk-21 (250) United States 300 6.6 135 9.6 2,884
Mk-12A, 3x (220) United States 335 6.9 148 8.8 2,949
RS-12M2/12M (177) Russia 800 9.7 296 4.4 3,510
Land-based missiles
DF-21 (<100) China 300 6.6 135 9.6 2,884
DF-3A/4 (10) China 3,300 17.1 921 1.4 4,660
DF-5A (20) China 5,000 20.2 1,284 1.0 5,063
Note. The approximate relationship of the radius of the area burned relative to blast yield, Rkm = 0.67 (KT)
0.4, was calibrated to the firestorm 
at Hiroshima.36 All bomb yields and numbers deployed, unless noted:37 B61-12;38 Russian and Chinese ALCM yields.39 Where bombs were 
noted to have variable yields, the highest yields are shown; multiple warheads on single delivery vehicles are designated with “x.” Total 
yield is equivalent number multiplied by individual yields.
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Kuwaiti oil fields burning after the Gulf War in 1991.
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tries in total, there are roughly 1,682 
warheads deployed that have yields be-
tween 100 and 300 KT; ~697 warheads 
with yields between >300 and 800 KT; 
and ~41 warheads with yields between 
1 and 5 MT. Furthermore, the use of 
smaller bombs by any actor could eas-
ily escalate into the use of larger weap-
ons, such as any of the major types that 
are deployed and shown here, although 
new U.S. policy suggests the response to 
any adversarial use of nuclear weapons 
would elicit a “proportional” nuclear 
response by the United States.31 Nuclear 
drought events could also occur by re-
gional nuclear exchanges between Paki-
stan and India (~6.6 Tg C), North Korea 
or Russia and the United States, or Israel 
and Iran, among many other possible 
increasing numbers of combinations.32
Vegetation is not required to pro-
duce significant climate impacts. Even 
in the desert Middle East, a single high- 
temperature nuclear explosion (e.g., 
3,000–7,700°C) could ignite above-
ground oil reserves, infrastructures, 
and wellheads, and produce significant 
stratospheric particle dispersion.33 A 
nuclear explosion could create greater 
climate impacts than the Kuwaiti oil 
field fires of 1991 due to higher altitude 
smoke dispersion into the stratosphere 
and more wellheads potentially being ig-
nited. During the Gulf War in 1991, Ku-
waiti oil wells were set on fire in January 
and some burned until November, when 
they were actively extinguished. At a rate 
of ~3,400 metric tons of soot emitted per 
day for approximately 6 months, ~0.6 Tg 
of black carbon was dispersed into the 
troposphere from 610 ignited wells.34
Climate Change, Nuclear 
Energy, and Nuclear Weapons
Many developed and developing 
countries (i.e., China, India, Pakistan, 
Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United 
Arab Emirates, Jordan, and Russia, 
among others) are expanding or plan to 
expand their nuclear energy sectors.40 
As a source of energy for development 
and to mitigate anthropogenic climate 
change, the global expansion of nuclear 
energy is recognized by many observers 
to also increase the probability of future 
nuclear weapons events.41
In 2016, North Korea conducted two 
nuclear weapons tests and related mis-
sile tests showing that the country is 
developing advanced capabilities. North 
Korea’s September 9, 2016, nuclear test 
was the 2,056th nuclear test conducted 
since 1945 by one of eight countries.42 
On January 27, 2017, satellite photos 
indicated that North Korea had also 
resumed plutonium production at the 
Yongbyon nuclear reactor, which had 
produced fuel for its previous nuclear 
tests.43 With associated spent fuel repro-
cessing, the Yongbyon facility can pro-
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duce ~6 kg per year of weapons-grade 
plutonium (>93% plutonium-239), 
enough for roughly one bomb per year.44 
Yongbyon is one of 16 significant repro-
cessing facilities globally; each country 
with a nuclear weapons program has at 
least one facility.45 Iran also has many 
reasons to want a nuclear weapons pro-
gram, including developing a deterrent 
against its two main rivals, the United 
States and Israel, both nuclear powers. 
Iran has key nuclear facilities in Arak, 
Bushehr, Natanz, Qom, and Parchin 
to enrich uranium and dramatically 
shorten the time to “break out” the pro-
duction of nuclear weapons. Iran has 
also invested in developing new missiles 
that analysts believe can carry a nuclear 
payload.46
Further nuclear threats include ter-
rorists obtaining fissile materials from 
either existing official nuclear weapons 
states (United States, Russia, United 
Kingdom, France, China) or unofficial 
countries (India, Pakistan, Israel, North 
Korea) or from any of the 450 nuclear 
power facilities operating in 30 coun-
tries globally.47 To prevent nuclear ter-
rorism from occurring, governments 
have primarily sought to secure all fis-
sile nuclear materials internationally.48
These existing and increasing nu-
clear threats will be further impacted 
by fossil-fueled anthropogenic climate 
change, which will increase the prob-
ability of future conflicts.49 Over the 
long term, potential sea-level rise by 
4 to >6 meters by 2100 could result in 
more than a billion migrants, which 
could also exacerbate global conflicts.50 
Escalation of conflicts to limited nuclear 
confrontations could result from any 
or all of these factors, especially given 
enough time for such events to occur.
Risk Assessment, Perception, 
and Ethical Considerations
One measure of the relative attention 
given to critical environmental issues 
over time is the frequency of words oc-
curring in published books. The relative 
frequency of “nuclear war” and “nuclear 
weapons” peaked in English books in 
1986 and 1987, respectively (Figure 1). 
“Climate change” became a relatively 
dominant term beginning in 2001, with 
“global warming” being less prevalent. 
“Nuclear winter” also peaked in 1987, 
and “nuclear autumn” has been used 
even less, with both terms occurring at 
least 80 times less frequently than “cli-
mate change” by 2008. Due to the rela-
tive prevalence of “nuclear weapons” 
since the 1960s, emphasis on these is-
sues is likely to continue. Such language 
terms are also imprecise and vague, and 
could describe a multitude of phenom-
Missiles paraded in North Korea to celebrate the 105th birthday of Kim Il Sung in Pyongyang, 
April 15, 2017.
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A 21 KT nuclear explosion with battleships for size reference at Bikini Atoll, July 25,1946. The world’s largest nuclear bomb deployed today by 
China (5 MT) is 238 times larger and could ignite ~1280 square kilometers of land.
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ena, which is why such terms need to 
be accompanied by specific numbers 
and further qualifying descriptors to be 
meaningful.51
A multitude of changing forces have 
shaped public discourse on diverse en-
vironmental topics over the last cen-
tury.52 Most environmental politics have 
tended to approach problems on re-
gional scales due to local political power 
dynamics, which may have limited con-
cern for nuclear climate impacts that 
would occur on a global scale.53 Yet in 
2017, the World Economic Forum rec-
ognized weapons of mass destruction 
(WMDs, which primarily include nu-
clear weapons) to be the largest poten-
tial negative impact for the global econ-
omy out of all major threats in the next 
10 years.54 Past trends also reflect the 
nature of nuclear weapons as fast-acting 
and immediate risks relative to climate 
change concerns, which have been seen 
by many as more of a long-term issue. 
But even to limit temperature increases 
to 2°C, projections of carbon emissions 
under the 2016 Paris Agreement would 
still require undeveloped and optimis-
tic negative emissions technology to be 
employed at scale by ~2030, suggest-
ing the immense magnitude of the task 
posed to mitigate the destructive effects 
of anthropogenic climate change, and 
explaining why nuclear energy may be 
more prevalent in the future as a re-
duced-emissions energy source.55
As a result of recent developments in 
nuclear weapons, nuclear energy, and cli-
mate change, the Doomsday Clock was 
set 2 minutes closer to midnight in 2015, 
and in 2017 the clock moved 30 seconds 
closer, to 2½ minutes to midnight, due 
to global political developments; this is 
the closest to midnight since 1953, after 
the United States and Russia first tested 
thermonuclear bombs.56 Despite omi-
nous risk assessments from the World 
Economic Forum, the Doomsday Clock, 
and many others discussed in the pre-
ceding, social incentives interfere with 
our risk perception, in addition to prev-
alent psychological tendencies that also 
cause us to underestimate risks.57 The 
philosopher of science Karl Popper simi-
larly warned of our narrow perspectives: 
“Our own ways of life are still beset by ta-
boos; food taboos, taboos of politeness, 
and many others.”58 Financial incentives 
can also interfere with scientific judg-
ment, as recently elaborated by the U.S. 
National Academy of Sciences: “Judges 
and juries, however, must consider fi-
nancial conflicts of interest when assess-
ing scientific testimony. The threshold 
for pursuing the possibility of bias must 
be low. In some instances, judges have 
been frustrated in identifying expert 
witnesses who are free of conflict of in-
terest because entire fields of science 
seem to be co-opted by payments from 
industry.”59 Institutional incentives on 
science have also recently been asserted 
to limit the identification of true novel 
relationships, as opposed to the repeated 
production of false positives.60 Corpo-
rate executives also recognize power-
ful internal and external forces that can 
undermine business performance and 
increase unnecessary risks.61
Beyond the social and institutional 
issues, the values behind our actions are 
also defined by philosophy and religion. 
Our moral responses to the threats of 
nuclear weapons, or to any ethical issue, 
evolve as the result of complex moral 
reasoning, interpretation, and our per-
sonal histories.62 Ethical dilemmas such 
as determining the “best” approach to 
the problems of nuclear weapons, un-
fortunately, will not be resolved by re-
course to facts alone, nor can any final 
moral conclusions be obtained by phi-
losophy.63 Despite such uncertainty, any 
management of nuclear weapons should 
clearly try to minimize harm to civilian 
populations to the highest degree pos-
Figure 1. Nuclear weapons “on our minds”: The relative frequency of nuclear 
weapons and climate change issues in English books, 1945–2008.
 
Source: Google Books Ngram Viewer, http://books.google.com/ngrams.
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sible; however, even the indirect climate 
effects of limited use of nuclear weapons 
on noncivilian targets may still be able 
to kill a billion people.
When considering the immense 
risks to global human well-being posed 
by the climate effects of limited nuclear 
weapons use and the associated spread 
of toxic radionuclides, it appears en-
tirely appropriate to reflect on the mas-
sively devastating and nearly continu-
ous wars of global history; perhaps we 
should not be overly optimistic and rely 
too much on the notion that “this time is 
different.”64 Where we do not act due to 
our conflicting obligations, where is the 
threshold that identifies us as bystand-
ers to the grand perils of nuclear weap-
ons use?65 All of these social, cultural, 
and ethical factors have the potential to 
create biased evaluations and influence 
our perceptions and actions concerning 
the climate change risks and other haz-
ards from nuclear weapons.
Nuclear Weapons in Transition
As the climate implications of the 
limited use of nuclear weapons be-
come more widely recognized and bet-
ter characterized, specialized nuclear 
weapons, such as electromagnetic pulse 
(EMP) devices that are detonated 
at an altitude of >25 km, may be-
come preferable alternatives that 
would not oxidize terrestrial car-
bon but could still serve strategic 
objectives.66 When detonated, an 
EMP device ionizes atmospheric 
molecules and creates a massive 
surge of free electrons that can 
overload electrical systems and 
cause widespread failures, thus 
disrupting the ionosphere, as op-
posed to the biosphere. In 1962, 
a U.S. EMP test with a 1.4-MT 
nuclear explosion at an altitude 
of ~400 km above sea level un-
expectedly caused streetlights to 
burn out and a communications 
system failure in Honolulu, Ha-
waii, which was ~1,100 km from 
the epicenter of the blast.67 Most 
electrical systems across a broad 
area under such an EMP explo-
sion would become nonfunc-
tional; the blast would only harm 
people who are directly depen-
dent on electrical devices for survival, 
but the global climate implications from 
the use of conventional nuclear weapons 
would be averted. Uses of EMP devices 
have been widely discussed as probable 
strategic applications of nuclear weap-
ons, although their possible exclusive 
use instead of conventional bombs has 
received less attention.68
In summary, as long as conven-
tional nuclear weapons are prevalent, 
the breadth of existing research indi-
cates that the question is not whether 
a nuclear drought can occur, but what 
factors increase its probability of oc-
curring and what actions can be taken 
to mitigate the potentially devastat-
ing global impacts. Even in the 1950s, 
John von Neumann, Princeton profes-
sor of mathematical physics, creator of 
game theory, and a major designer of 
the modern computer (which was used 
primarily for nuclear weapons develop-
ment), thought “atomic war was almost 
certainly unavoidable”—a conclusion 
that Stephen Hawking echoes today.69 
Is sufficient action being taken today to 
avoid the limited use of nuclear weap-
ons in the future and avert the poten-
tial for devastating climate impacts and 
the associated spread of toxic radio- 
nuclides? Accumulated research is al-
ready specific enough to provide ad-
equate incentives to approach the 
problem of nuclear drought with a new 
urgency. The storage of nuclear spent 
fuel rods in vulnerable facilities also 
needs greater attention, as the Fuku-
 
An electromagnetic pulse created by a 1.4 MT 
atmospheric nuclear explosion at an altitude 
of 400 km.
Nuclear ballistic missiles on parade in Moscow, May 2014.
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shima disaster dramatically showed. 
More research is needed for a better 
understanding of the probability of nu-
clear weapon events and to foster more 
adequate responses and alternative solu-
tions to these serious global challenges 
for a future sustainable environment.
Adam J. Liska is an associate professor and the George 
Dempster Smith Chair of Industrial Ecology in the De-
partments of Biological Systems Engineering and Agron-
omy and Horticulture at the University of Nebraska. 
Tyler R. White is Assistant Professor of Practice in the 
Department of Political Science at the University of Ne-
braska. Eric R. Holley is a doctoral student in the School 
of Natural Resources at the University of Nebraska. Rob-
ert J. Oglesby is a professor of Earth and Atmospheric 
Sciences at the University of Nebraska.
The authors thank William Charlton, Julie Thomson, and 
the editors for helpful comments.
© 2017 Adam J. Liska, Tyler R. White, Eric R. Holley, and 
Robert J. Oglesby. 
Published with license by Taylor & Francis. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial 
re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited, and is not 
altered, transformed, or built upon in any way.
NOTES
1. R. Wuthnow, Be Very Afraid: The Cultural Re-
sponse to Terror, Pandemics, Environmental Devastation, 
Nuclear Annihilation, and other Threats (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2010).
2. O. B. Toon et al., “Consequences of Regional-Scale 
Nuclear Conflicts,” Science 315, no. 5816 (2007): 1224–25; 
O. B. Toon et al., “Atmospheric Effects and Societal Con-
sequences of Regional Scale Nuclear Conflicts and Acts 
of Individual Nuclear Terrorism,” Atmospheric Chemistry 
and Physics 7, no. 8 (2006): 1973–2002 (revised 2007); L. 
Badash, A Nuclear Winter’s Tale (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 2009); A. Robock and O. B. Toon, “Local Nuclear 
War, Global Suffering” Scientific American 302, no. 1 
(2010): 74–81; D. Pimentel and M. Burgess, “Nuclear War 
Investigation Related to a Limited Nuclear Battle with 
Emphasis on Agricultural Impacts in the United States,” 
Ambio 41 no. 8 (2012): 894–99; M. J. Mills, O. B. Toon, J. 
Lee-Taylor, and A. Robock, “Multidecadal Global Cool-
ing and Unprecedented Ozone Loss Following a Regional 
Nuclear Conflict,” Earth’s Future 2, no. 4 (2014): 161–76.
3. S. Knapton, “Prof Stephen Hawking: Disaster on 
Planet Earth is a Near Certainty,” The Telegraph, 19 Janu-
ary 2016. If there is a small probability of an event occur-
ring each day, then over time these probabilities increase 
due to multiplication of the individual daily probabilities 
and opportunities: see D. J. Hand, The Improbability Prin-
ciple: Why Coincidences, Miracles, and Rare Events Hap-
pen Every Day (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2014).
4. J. F. Harris and B. Bender, “Bill Perry is Terrified. 
Why Aren’t You?” Politico, 6 January 2017.
5. L. Eden et  al., “It Is 30 Seconds Closer to Mid-
night,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 25 January 2017; 
M. O’Hanlon and D. Petraeus, “America’s Awesome Mili-
tary and How to Make it Even Better,” Foreign Affairs 95, 
no. 5 (2016): 10–17; J. A. Larsen and K. M. Kartchner, 
eds., On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century (Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014); H. Kissinger, 
World Order (New York, NY: Penguin, 2014); R. Rhodes, 
Twilight of the Bombs: Recent Challenges, New Dangers, 
and the Prospects for a World Without Nuclear Weap-
ons (New York, NY: Knopf, 2010); J. Cirincione, Bomb 
Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons (New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2008); G. Allison, 
Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe 
(New York, NY: Henry Holt, 2005); R. S. McNamara and 
J. B. Blight, Wilson’s Ghost: Reducing the Risk of Conflict, 
Killing, and Catastrophe in the 21st Century (New York, 
NY: Public Affairs, 2001).
6. Toon et al., 2006, note 2.
7. Black carbon is the radiation-absorbing com-
ponents of soot, which are elemental carbon and some 
condensed organics; V. Ramanathan and G. Carmichael, 
“Global and Regional Climate Changes due to Black Car-
bon,” Nature Geoscience 1, no. 4 (2008), 221–27.
8. K. Schaul, “Eight Countries. 2,056 Nuclear Tests. 
71 Years—Mapped,” The Washington Post, 9 September 
2016; SIPRI Yearbook 2014: Armaments, Disarmament, 
and International Security (Oxford, UK: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2014), 350.
9. Toon et al., note 2.
10. Black carbon emissions from fossil fuel and bio-
mass burning have already been shown to decrease re-
gional tropical rainfall from 1950 to 2002; Ramanathan 
and Carmichael, note 7.
11. Robock and Toon, note 2; J. D. Sachs, The Age of 
Sustainable Development (New York, NY: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2015).
12. T. A. Carleton and S. M. Hsiang, “Social and Eco-
nomic Impacts of Climate,” Science 353, no. 6304 (2016), 
aad9837; S. M. Hsiang, M. Burke, and E. Miguel, “Quan-
tifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict,” Sci-
ence 341, no. 6151 (2013): 1235367-1–14; T. F. Homer-
Dixon, Environment, Scarcity, and Violence (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999).
13. T. Wada et  al., “Effects of the Nuclear Disaster 
on Marine Products in Fukushima,” Journal of Environ-
mental Radioactivity 136 (2013): 246–54; K. O. Buesseler 
et  al., “Fukushima-Derived Radionuclides in the Ocean 
and Biota off Japan,” Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences 109, no. 16 (2012): 5984–88.
14. For the probable spread of toxic radionuclides 
from nuclear power plants meltdowns, see C. Perrow, 
The Next Catastrophe: Reducing Our Vulnerabilities to 
Natural, Industrial, and Terrorist Disasters (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 133–48; for details 
on comparable contamination from atmospheric and 
underground nuclear detonations in Nevada, and the 
Hanford reactors, see H. G. Wilshire, J. E. Nielson, and 
R. W. Hazlett, The American West at Risk: Science, Myths, 
and Politics of Land Abuse and Recovery (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 181–212, 395–409; M. S. 
Gerber, On the Home Front: The Cold War Legacy of the 
Hanford Nuclear Site, 2nd ed. (Lincoln, NE: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2002); for improved targeting of nuclear 
arsenals, see H. M. Kristensen, M. Mckenzie, and T. A. 
Atmospheric particle dispersion from a 10 MT nuclear bomb test, ‘Ivy Mike’, October 31, 1952.
W
ik
im
ed
ia
 C
om
m
on
s/
U
S
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f D
ef
en
se
JULY/AUGUST 2017 WWW.ENVIRONMENTMAGAZINE.ORG ENVIRONMENT  33
Postol, “How US Nuclear Modernization is Undermining 
Strategic Stability: The Burst-Height Compensating Su-
per-Fuse”, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1 March 2017.
15. A. Gilligan, “Fukushima: Tokyo Was on the 
Brink of Nuclear Catastrophe, Admits Former Prime 
Minister,” The Telegraph, 4 March 2016; A. Petryna, Life 
Exposed: Biological Citizens After Chernobyl (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013).
16. A. J. Liska and C. D. Heier, “The Limits to Com-
plexity: A Thermodynamic History of Bioenergy,” Bio- 
fuels, Bioproducts and Biorefining 7, no. 5 (2013): 573–81.
17. J. Casti, X-Events: The Collapse of Everything 
(New York: HarperCollins, 2012), page 8; Perrow, note 
14.
18. Larsen and Kartchner, note 5, page 6.
19. B. W. Bennett, “On US Preparedness for Lim-
ited Nuclear War,” in J. A. Larsen and K. M. Kartchner, 
eds., On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century (Stan-
ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 211–43; C. H. 
Quester, “The End of the Nuclear Taboo?,” in J. A. Larsen 
and K. M. Kartchner, eds., On Limited Nuclear War in the 
21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
2014), 172–90.
20. Kristensen et al., note 14; Quester, note 19, page 
182; The Economist, “Nuclear Weapons—Cruise Con-
trol—Obama Administration’s Trillion-Dollar Plan,” 23 
January 2016.
21. J. J. Wirtz, “Limited Nuclear War Reconsidered,” 
in J. A. Larsen and K. M. Kartchner, eds., On Limited 
Nuclear War in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2014), 263–71.
22. McNamara and Blight, note 5.
23. Harris and Bender, note 4; Larsen and Kartchner, 
note 5; Casti, note 17.
24. M. Yusuf, “An India–Pakistan Crisis: Should We 
Care?,” warontherocks.com, 29 November 2016.
25. P. I. Bernstein, “The Emerging Nuclear Land-
scape,” in J. A. Larsen and K. M. Kartchner, eds., On 
Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2014), 101–28.
26. P. Bump, “Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin 
agree: Let’s Revive the Nuclear Arms Race,” The Washing-
ton Post, 22 December 2016.
27. Bernstein, note 25, page 109.
28. SIPRI Yearbook 2014, note 8.
29. H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, “Status of 
World Nuclear Forces,” 11 January 2017, fas.org (accessed 
27 January 2017).
30. H. M. Kristensen and R. S. Norris, “Russian 
Nuclear Forces, 2016,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 72, 
no. 3 (2016): 125–34; A. F. Wolf, “US Strategic Nuclear 
Forces: Background, Developments, Issues” (Washing-
ton DC: Congressional Research Service, 27 September 
2016); M. Ahmed, “Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons 
and Their Impact on Stability,” 30 June 2016, carnegieen-
dowment.org (accessed 27 January 2017); I. Sutyagin, 
“Atomic Accounting: A New Estimate of Russia’s Non-
Strategic Nuclear Forces,” November 2012, www.rusi.org 
(accessed 27 January 2017).
31. Bennett, note 19, page 221.
32. Casti, note 17; Robock and Toon, note 2.
33. S. Glasstone and P. J. Dolan, The Effects of Nu-
clear Weapons, 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: US Department 
of Defense, 1977); P. Crutzen and J. Birks, “Twilight at 
Noon: The Atmosphere After a Nuclear War,” Ambio 11, 
no. 2–3 (1982): 114–25.
34. P. V. Hobbs and L. F. Radke, “Airborne Studies 
of the Smoke From the Kuwait Oil Fires,” Science 256, no. 
5059 (1992): 987–91.
35. Toon et al., note 2.
36. Glasstone and Dolan, note 33; Toon et al., note 2.
37. SIPRI Yearbook 2014, note 8; Bennett, note 19, 
page 213.
38. The Economist, note 20.
39. A. Barr and R. Johnson, “Nukes Ready to Fly,” 
National Post, 4 May 2012.
40. The Economist, “Nuclear Power in the Middle 
East,” 28 November 2015; R. Murray and K. E. Holbert, 
Nuclear Energy: An Introduction to the Concepts, Systems, 
and Applications of Nuclear Processes, 7th Ed (Amster-
dam: Elsevier, 2014).
41. Kissinger, note 5; Rhodes, note 5; M. Fuhrmann, 
Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause 
Nuclear Insecurity (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2012); S. D. Sagan, “The Causes of Nuclear Weapons Pro-
liferation,” Annual Review of Political Science 14 (2011): 
225–44; R. H. Socolow and A. Glaser, “Balancing Risks: 
Nuclear Energy and Climate Change,” Daedalus 138, no. 
4 (2009): 31–44.
42. Schaul, note 8.
43. S. Kim, “North Korea Restarts Yongbyon Plu-
tonium Reactor, Institute Says,” Bloomberg, 27 January 
2017.
44. S. S. Hecker, S. C. Lee, and C. Braun, “North Ko-
rea’s Choice: Bombs Over Electricity,” The Bridge 40, no. 
2 (2010): 5–12.
45. SIPRI Yearbook 2014, note 8, page 345.
46. J. A. Stacey, “Bringing Iran in from the Cold,” 
Foreign Affairs, 18 January 2016.
47. Nuclear Energy Institute, “World Statistics: Nu-
clear Energy Around the World,” www.nei.org (accessed 
24 January 2017); Cirincione, note 5; Perrow, note 14.
48. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “The 2016 NTI 
Nuclear Security Index: Theft and Sabotage: Building a 
Framework for Assurance, Accountability, and Action, 
3rd Edition,” January 2016, www.ntiindex.org (accessed 
31 January 2017).
49. Carleton and Hsiang, note 12; Hsiang et al., note 
12; Homer-Dixon, note 12.
50. J. T. Overpeck et al., “Paleoclimatic Evidence for 
Future Ice-Sheet Instability and Rapid Sea-Level Rise,” 
Science 311, no. 5768 (2006): 1747–50; N. Stern, Why Are 
We Waiting? The Logic, Urgency, and Promise of Tackling 
Climate Change (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2015); 
R. Reuveny, “Climate Change-Induced Migration and 
Violent Conflict,” Political Geography 26, no. 6 (2007): 
656–73.
51. K. van Deemter, Not Exactly: In Praise of Vague-
ness (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010).
52. F. Buell, From Apocalypse to Way of Life: Envi-
ronmental Crisis in the American Century (New York, NY: 
Routledge, 2004).
53. S. O’Lear, Environmental Politics: Scale and Power 
(New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
54. The Global Risks Report 2017, 12th ed. (Geneva, 
Switzerland: World Economic Forum, 2017).
55. K. Anderson and G. Peters, “The Trouble With 
Negative Emissions,” Science, 354, no. 6309(2016): 182–83.
56. Eden et al., note 2.
57. Wuthnow, note 1; D. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast 
and Slow (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 
2011); C. R. Sunstein, Infotopia: How Many Minds Pro-
duce Knowledge (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2006).
58. K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, 
5th ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966), 
page 173.
59. Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 3rd ed. 
(Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 2011).
60. P. E. Smaldino and R. McElreath, “The Natural 
Selection of Bad Science,” Royal Society Open Science 3 
(2016): 160384.
61. B. W. Heineman, High Performance With High 
Integrity (Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 
2008); Perrow, note 14 above.
62. R. Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2011).
63. A. MacIntyre, After Virture, 3rd ed. (Notre 
Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007); B. 
Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1985); Dworkin, note 62.
64. C. M. Reinhardt and K. Rogoff, This Time Is Dif-
ferent: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2009); P. Kennedy, The Rise 
and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Mili-
tary Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York, NY: Random 
House, 1987); Kahneman, note 57.
65. M. H. Bazerman and A. E. Tenbrunsel, Blind 
Spots: Why We Fail to Do What’s Right and What to Do 
About It (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2011); E. Staub, The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide 
and Other Group Violence (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993).
66. Bennett, note 19; S. D. Baum, “Winter-Safe De-
terrence: The Risk of Nuclear Winter and Its Challenge 
to Deterrence,” Contemporary Security Policy 36, no. 1 
(2015): 123–48.
67. Casti, note 17.
68. Larsen and Kartchner, note 5; O’Hanlon and 
Petraeus, note 5; Casti, note 17; Bennett, note 19; Baum, 
note 66.
69. A. Jocabsen, The Pentagon’s Brain: An Uncen-
sored History of DARPA, America’s Top Secret Military 
Research Agency (New York, NY: Little, Brown, 2015), 
page 30; G. Dyson, Turing’s Cathedral: The Origins of the 
Digital Universe (New York, NY: Random House, 2012).
Atmospheric particle dispersion from a 15 KT nuclear 
artillery shell test in Nevada, May 25, 1953.
W
ik
im
ed
ia
 C
om
m
on
s/
U
S
 D
ep
ar
tm
en
t o
f D
ef
en
se
